

~~SECRET~~**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Problems with Draft SIG-I Working Group Report - MEMO TO DDCI

FROM

Chief, Policy Branch/PPS

EXTENSION**NO.****DATE** 22 May 1986**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

EO

5/23

23 May

M

2.

D/S

3.

PPG

5/23

BE

Mailed 23 May 86

4.

Registry

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

1.

1.

**OS REGISTRY
FILE**FORM
1-79**610**USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

23 MAY 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Problems with Draft SIG-I Working Group Report

25X1

General Stilwell has submitted for review a draft of the "Plans for Enhancement" section of the President's report to Congress on counterintelligence and security. Listed below are views we presented to the Working Group on three issues fundamental to the proper and successful conduct of CIA's security program. However, counterviews, particularly from DoD, have tended to obscure our position.

25X1

Common Scope for Top Secret and SCI

DoD has repeatedly proposed that the scope of investigative coverage for SCI be reduced from 15 years to some shorter period; CIA has repeatedly resisted this. By reducing the scope, DoD hopes to realize some cost savings. However, the unique nature of SCI, its sensitivity and its fragility, and the special and statutory responsibilities of the DCI to protect it, militate against the DoD position.

The greater scope of investigative coverage for access to SCI is designed to compensate for its proliferation and its relatively lax document control (as compared to the more limited distribution and strict accountability of Top Secret information). A 1980 SECOM study indicated that small, but significant, amounts of noteworthy information would be lost if the investigative scope were to be reduced to even 10 years. However, we recognize the need for current research regarding the cost and utility of various aspects of our investigative process. Such research would allow us to participate in meaningful discussions with DoD and others on this subject. Until such research is completed, however, the Office of Security is strongly opposed to any reduction in the pre-screening protection currently afforded SCI.

25X1

25X1

S E C R E T

US 6 2101

Preempting NSDD-84 Working Group

The draft report contains several pages of recommendations and statements which would, in effect, impose direction and substance on the Working Group which was chartered by Presidential directive (NSDD-84) to prepare a new Executive Order on personnel security. Many of these recommendations and statements contain inaccuracies and elements which are either unacceptable to CIA, and other agencies such as OPM and DOE not represented on the Stilwell Working Group, or which require further study before being considered as something to be mandated. We also object in principle to preempting the prerogatives of a properly chartered and expert interagency group. We believe this detailed section should be replaced with a general statement to be provided by or coordinated with the NSDD-84 Working Group.

25X1

Restrictions on the Scope of Polygraph Testing

In the draft and in virtually every document we have seen from DoD which mentions polygraph testing, the phrase, "counterintelligence-scope polygraph" is used. We are concerned that continual use of this phrase as a general description of polygraph testing may eventually result in a universal perception that such limited testing is the only proper and permissible kind. This could adversely affect the CIA polygraph program in future years and could make it extremely difficult for other agencies to implement expanded polygraph programs if they chose to do so. This very problem was recognized by the NSDD-84 Working Group which decided to avoid such restrictive language. Where applicable, we have offered the alternative language, "polygraph testing as deemed appropriate by the agency head and in compliance with applicable law and regulation."

25X1

General Comments on the Working Group Paper

In addition to the above major points, I am disappointed by the overall scope and utility of the Stilwell product. The Working Group met for long hours over the course of many weeks, deliberating pertinent issues and gathering and refining information. We expected this information to be distilled into a concise "Presidential" statement of basic functions, accomplishments, shortfalls and issues, plus policy and program direction for the 1980's.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Instead, the report is emerging, not as a distillation, but as an expansion of the Working Group's efforts with a decidedly DoD tilt flavored strongly with what appear to be General Stilwell's own views. As an expansion, it contains new issues which have not been adequately discussed and presents some contentious issues in a way which improperly implies interagency agreement.

Also, as an expanded document, the report no longer pretends to be "Presidential". We understand that General Stilwell intends to forward the report with a covering memorandum of endorsement for the President's signature. Because the report is so overly detailed and contains many recommendations, some of them controversial, ambiguous or premature, I believe it will cause more harm than good if it is provided to the Congress without considerable pruning. I am advising General Stilwell of my concerns but he has made it quite clear that he is committed to the present scope and thrust; I expect only token concessions as the draft is finalized.

25X1

!OS/PPS/OS

(19 May 86)!

25X1

!Distribution:!

! Orig - Adse!
! 1 - GC!
! 2 - DDA!
! 1 - D/S Chrono!
! 1 - PPS Chrono!
! ① - OS Registry!

S E C R E T